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The Terror Exception: The Impact of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force on United
States Counterterrorism Policy in the Middle East under the Obama Administration

Benjamin Collinger

Collinger
In the traumatic and somber aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S.
Congress passed a critical piece of legislation to provide the president authority to defend the
United States and its interests abroad. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which
responded to the horrors of 9/11, began the United States’ longest war—the global war on terror—
and serves as its legal basis today. President George W. Bush signed the AUMF into law on
September 18, 2001, only a week after the attacks. Congress agreed with the proposition:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.1

The AUMF enabled President Bush to defend the United States against al-Qa’ida and other entities
that carried out 9/11. Congress rejected the Bush administration’s first draft of the legislation
because they believed it was too expansive. The initial wording provided the president with
authority “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression,”2 which Congress
rejected on the grounds that such language would provide the Executive Branch with power at the
expense of Congress. Congress rejected other requests from the Bush administration, including
one to transfer appropriations power to the president, and another that restricted Congress’ access
to classified briefings. The Bush administration also asked for authority to waive restrictions on
foreign assistance without notifying Congress, which could unilaterally override Congressional
mandates not to assist countries who commit human rights violations, cause nuclear proliferation,
and sponsor terrorism.3 As David Abramowitz, the Democratic Chief Counsel of the House
Committee on International Relations, explained at the time, “the requests from the White House
in response to this crisis were particularly breathtaking, and the results of many of these proposals
were far narrower than those put forth initially by the President.”4 In other words, the rejection by
a Congress of expanded executive authority guarded the separation of powers.
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Although Congress diluted the Bush administration’s original proposals by rejecting what
Representatives viewed as unreasonable expansions of executive authority, the AUMF still
authorized an entirely new security apparatus designed to fight terrorism. This apparatus has
impacted nearly all aspects of the federal government and has created a new power dynamic in
public policy. For example, at least 263 organizations have been created or reorganized in response
to 9/11 (e.g. The Department of Homeland Security).5 Additionally, the Bush and Obama
administrations’ justification for policies like the detention of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo
Bay, drone strikes, and mass data collection, all derive from or were catalyzed by the AUMF.
Because it remains the preeminent legal basis for the U.S. global war on terror, the AUMF
influences how the United States employs force, cooperates with foreign countries, and treats civil
liberties. Today, these subjects create antagonistic international debates about U.S. foreign policy.
Yet, while the law’s impact now sparks controversy, the 2001 debate in Congress was almost
entirely devoid of disagreement.
The AUMF garnered unanimity in the Senate with only one dissenting vote in the House
of Representatives. The sole “nay” came from Rep. Barbara Lee, a Democrat from California. On
the floor of the House of Representatives three days after 9/11, Lee argued that
We must not rush to judgment. Far too many innocent people have already died. Our country is in mourning.
If we rush to launch a counter-attack, we run too great a risk that women, children, and other non-combatants
will be caught in the crossfire.6

Lee reminded the House how the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution justified a long and undeclared
war in Vietnam. She remarked, “we must be careful not to embark on an open-ended war with
neither an exit strategy nor a focused target. We cannot repeat past mistakes.”7 Now fifteen years
after the law was enacted, it is critical to examine Rep. Lee’s warning to inform future U.S foreign
policy in the context of war powers and counterterrorism. Has 9/11 and the AUMF, like the Gulf
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of Tonkin incident and resolution, been used to justify an “open-ended war with neither an exit
strategy nor a focused target” for counterterrorism in the Middle East?
The State of Exception in Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism has undoubtedly become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East. A great deal of U.S. strategy involves intelligence sharing with allies to kill top
terrorists.8 Daniel Byman, Georgetown University professor and senior fellow at The Brookings
Institution, argues that the Obama administration’s fixation on counterterrorism often leads the
United States to miss broader regional trends that undermine our interests, and overlook
opportunities to prevent or mitigate regional conflicts.9 According to Byman, “Counterterrorism
not only explains where Obama has been aggressive; it also explains the limits of where he acts,”
such as deploying force to fight al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)10 within Syria rather than building those countries’
governance and defense capabilities. Moreover, Byman argues that the focus on counterterrorism
inflates the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. interests by enflaming a cycle of violence. Threat
inflation (often peddled by bellicose leaders) skews public opinion to favor costly action, even
when such action may only threaten national security.
To explain the AUMF’s mandate in relation to the phenomenon Byman describes, I turn to
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s framework from State of Exception for its fusion of political
theory and philosophy in the context of executive power and national security. In reading a wide
variety of national security related literature, I have found a stark dichotomy between legal and
philosophical argumentation that scholars rarely bridge. This dichotomy reflects Michel
Foucault’s observation that on the Right the problem of power is posed in juridical terms (e.g.
constitution and sovereignty); on the Left power is posed in terms of the state apparatus (e.g.
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culture and institutions).11 Bridging elements of both in a coherent theory allows us to better
contextualize the impact of the AUMF. Using Agamben’s State of Exception is an inherently
Foucauldian project, concerned with examining, “The way power was exercised—concretely, and
in detail—with its specificity, its techniques and tactics.”12 Specifically, I will examine the
“techniques and tactics” that the Obama administration has used to justify an expansion of
executive power and the war on terror vis-à-vis the AUMF.
Agamben explains that leaders often use national emergencies to justify illegal expansions
of their power. Such moves create a state of exception where law and praxis blur to a point in
which the executive’s violent actions exist in a space unchecked by the law.13 In some instances,
one can recognize states of exception fairly easily. For example, take the aftermath of the July 15,
2016 attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government. After the
coup failed, Erdogan declared a state of emergency which granted him the authority to dismiss
more than 100,000 public officials, detain 40,000 citizens, and arrest an additional 32,000.14 The
Turkish President extended the state of emergency for an additional three months, which has
enabled him to combat and reduce the power of political rivals across the country.15 Erdogan’s
actions obviously exist within a state of exception, but other situations in which executives operate
in a lawless vacuum are far less overt and comprehensible; many modern states of exception are
less overt and impact fewer people personally. Yet this is not necessarily true in post-9/11 America,
where the new security apparatus greatly impacts domestic social relations and foreign policy
alike.
Covert expansions of executive power within this apparatus represent the ambiguous space
where the AUMF exists: “a space that is neither outside nor inside.”16 I will refer to this legal space
as the “extra-legal,” where certain actions, though not necessarily directly against the law (illegal),
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are in an ambiguous zone prone to exploitation by political actors. My argument is not that political
actors should never interpret the law and instead cede all decisions to originalism, but that legal
innovation only operates effectively when foundational Constitutional principles guide it. Thus, I
will use Agamben’s framework to analyze the Obama administration’s deployment of the AUMF
and determine if such deployment inadvertently justified a permanently escalating war that
threatens U.S. national security. If the current application of the AUMF’s authority exists in an
extra-legal zone that promotes executive overreach in foreign affairs, it may be inconsistent with
our Constitutional principles.
Presidential War Powers and the AUMF
Policymakers should first evaluate the AUMF debate within the context of the U.S.
Constitution, because Article I gives Congress power to “provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States;17…declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;18 raise and support Armies;19…provide and
maintain a Navy” and other specific duties. Article II positions the president as the “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States.”20 While the president has the authority to direct
the armed forces once they are engaged in conflict, the Constitution does not grant the president
the authority to initiate force unless Congress has permitted it. The Constitution reflects the
founders’ belief that war is a collective decision to be checked and balanced by the republic,21
because following the experience of tyrannical English rule, the founders rejected extensive
executive power.22 Until the second half of the twentieth century, Congressional authorizations
preceded executive military actions,23 a norm that changed in 1950 when Truman began American
involvement in the Korean War via the United Nations. Although Congress recaptured its
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traditional war making duty by passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, the Johnson and
Nixon administrations applied the law at the expense of Congressional authority.
With eerily similar language to the AUMF, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution stated
That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression.24

While President Johnson told Congress that “the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no
wider war” the resolution provided the authority for a decade of U.S. military involvement in
Vietnam intended to “bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression”25 without a
declaration of war from Congress. In brief, Vietnam provoked massive backlash from civil society
which led to the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1971 and passage of the War Powers
Resolution (WPR) in 1973. The WPR has two key components: the 90-day limit, and the clear
statement rule. First, sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) limit the use of executive force to a maximum of 90
days without an authorization from Congress; second, section 8(a)(1) states that the executive
cannot infer Congressional approval without a specific statement authorizing such approval:
silence is not consent.26 As a result of the WPR, the long shadow of Vietnam legally shapes all
debates on the executive’s use of military force.
After learning the lessons of Vietnam, Congress intended for the 2001 AUMF to
“constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution” and noted that the new law does not supersede the WPR.27 But the age of fragmented
terrorist networks and drone warfare places the WPR’s purpose—to keep war-making in Congress’
realm—in an ambiguous zone because the president now exercises more national security
authority (e.g. through unilateral counterterrorism operations such as drone strikes).28 Given the
debates in both the Vietnam and 9/11 eras, the 2001 AUMF begs important questions regarding
how executive use of military force legally occurs. To begin, we must explore the development of
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the AUMF under the Obama administration, because most of the law’s legal and practical
development have occurred during Obama’s tenure. Curtis A. Bradley at Duke Law School and
Jack L. Goldsmith at Harvard Law School, argue that
almost every issue about the AUMF’s meaning and scope remained unresolved at the end of the Bush
presidency. It was during Obama’s time in office, guided by his Administration, that courts construed the
AUMF to resolve many of its ambiguities and uncertainties, and that Congress ratified the basic framework
of these judicial interpretations.29

Identifying the Obama administration’s “distinctive contributions made to AUMF jurisprudence,”
Bradley and Goldsmith note is, “a necessary prerequisite to any normative assessment of the
evolution of this body of law.”30
Distinctive Contributions
The Obama administration’s “distinctive contributions” occurred primarily in response to
the global war on terror’s volatility. Terrorist groups in the Middle East have divided, fragmented,
and coalesced to produce unpredictable results. Change has been driven partly by U.S.
counterterrorism policy to eliminate important leaders and make alliances of convenience, but
fragmentation has also occurred in response to social instability. For example, the U.S. alliance
with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and resulting sectarian instability are the proximate
causes of the rise of ISIL. Emma Sky, a British representative of the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Kirkuk in 2003 and political advisor to U.S. General Ray Odierno from 2007-2010,
argued that in 2013, President Obama “appeared to be paying scant attention to Maliki’s growing
authoritarianism and the deteriorating situation in the country.”31 This inattention enabled Maliki
to detain thousands of Sunnis without trial, push “leading Sunnis out of the political process by
accusing them of terrorism, and [renege] on payments and pledges to the awakening members who
had bravely fought al-Qaeda in Iraq…”32 As a result, ISIL was able to capitalize by claiming to be
defenders of the Sunnis against the Shia Maliki government. While Sunni tribes previously
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supported by the U.S. military, “had contained and defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq…those same tribes
were cooperating with [ISIL] in a popular uprising against the central government…[because] they
saw [ISIL] as the lesser of two evils when compared with Maliki.”33 In other words, the U.S.
alliance with Maliki contributed to our misreading of formerly friendly Sunni tribes and led to a
strengthened ISIL and Iraq’s unraveling.
Before ISIL’s formal creation in 2013, several organizations established themselves as
offshoots of al-Qa’ida. For example, AQAP formed in 2009 by merging al-Qa’ida branches in
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the Somali group Al-Shabaab formally joined al-Qa’ida in 2012.34
Thus, even before the emergence of ISIL, U.S. counterterrorism policy required significant
flexibility to respond to the shifting landscape of al-Qa’ida operatives. In this context, it seems
reasonable for the public to entrust the president with power to defend U.S. interests as
circumstances change and groups such as ISIL fragment. This argument—rooted in the
constitutional provision of the president as Commander in Chief—serves as a key premise in this
debate and tacitly frames many of the Obama administration’s positions. Yet, before we explore
the AUMF’s implications for ISIL today, we must explore the legal debate surrounding the AUMF.
The Obama administration has publicly detailed its interpretation of the AUMF in speeches
and court briefings. Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security, delivered two speeches on
the subject. When he was General Counsel of the Department of Defense in 2012, Johnson told
Oxford University students how the fight against al-Qa’ida relies on “conventional legal principles
found in treaties and customary international law,” despite the conflict’s unconventional nature.
Citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court decision that established the legality of Guantanamo
Bay detentions, Johnson noted that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with alQa’ida, thus, the international law of armed conflict applies.35 Similarly, when he was attorney
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general, Eric Holder remarked in 2012 at Northwestern University that, “We are a nation at war.
And…we face a nimble and determined enemy that cannot be underestimated.”36 Yet to many, the
war on terror does not resemble war or “armed conflict”; it is fought in an ad hoc manner against
multiple enemies instead of a singular state, American society has not been mobilized en masse,37
and territorial boundaries of the conflict are unclear. Therefore, defining counterterrorism in terms
of “armed conflict” seems contrived because it assumes parallels that do not exist.
Since neither the Geneva Conventions nor subsequent developments in customary
international law clearly define the term “armed conflict,”38 the Obama administration’s legal
innovations placed counterterrorism operations under the laws of war. However, other countries
differ as to whether terrorism counts as “armed conflict.” For example, when the United Kingdom
and France ratified Article 1 (4) of an additional protocol to the Geneva Convention, they noted in
a reservation that the term “armed conflict” is distinct from ordinary crimes, including acts of
terrorism, whether they are isolated or part of a concerted effort.39 This reservation was informed
by the argument that “The Troubles,” a tumultuous time in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998
that killed 3,600 and injured over 50,000,40 was not an “armed conflict.” Although the United
States did not concur and the reservation is not binding, the reservation is significant for at least
three reasons.
First, the reservation makes Johnson’s portrayal of international consensus on the laws of
war problematic; not all countries believe in the Obama administration’s premise that acts of
terrorism trigger the law of armed conflict. As a result, Obama administration officials’ statements
seem less credible and universal. Second, if the British and French interpretation were binding, it
would remove key premises based on international law that the United States depends upon to
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conduct counterterrorism operations legally. One example of this international legal dependency
is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdi. The court concluded that
detention is authorized is based on the necessary and appropriate force language of the AUMF. It is been
long recognized that preventive detention for the duration of the act of hostilities on a traditional battle field
is a necessary and appropriate incident of war.41

The Supreme Court’s justification for deeming detentions legal is that detaining enemies during
war is standard international practice, thereby centralizing international laws of war in the
decision’s reasoning.42 Yet without the premise that the U.S. is at war with al-Qa’ida (which the
court determined), the U.S. could not apply the international law of armed conflict. As a result, all
actions that derive legality from the law of armed conflict (e.g. the conditions for detention to be
legal at Guantanamo Bay which the Supreme Court affirmed in Hamdi) would be illegal if this
premise did not exist.
Third, the United Kingdom’s interpretation stems from terrorist attacks on home soil that
are very similar to attacks and conditions that the United States has experienced. Neither the Irish
Republican Army nor al-Qa’ida are states, the conflicts in both countries continued for an extended
period of time, and both conflicts greatly impacted their respective societies. Given these
circumstances, it would not be unreasonable for the United States to adopt the United Kingdom’s
interpretation and deem acts of terrorism distinct from “armed conflict.” But there are notable
differences: the U.S. fight is international; the actors’ demands and capabilities are different; the
defense mechanisms are different. Thus, the Obama administration’s deployment of the law of
armed conflict innovated in an underdetermined area of law. In this area, Eric A. Posner at the
University of Chicago, argues that
the US should not consider itself governed by the laws of war in its conflict with al Qaeda, as they are
normally understood, but it should be alert for opportunities for creating implicit norms of conduct that serve
the American interest.43
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Since the law is sufficiently ambiguous, it can be appropriated for a wide range of legal purposes.
Yet while extensive executive power serves short term security interests, deference to the
executive neglects the Constitution and civil liberties in the long term. Given these facts, will post9/11 counterterrorism efforts always be considered part of an “armed conflict”?
The Tipping Point
Jeh Johnson, clarifying the parameters of counterterrorism, acknowledged that the conflict
against terrorists will eventually lose the status of “armed conflict.” He stated that there will come
a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed
or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States,
such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in
2001, has been effectively destroyed.44

At the tipping point, Johnson reasons that American efforts could no longer be considered part of
an “‘armed conflict’ against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort
against individuals who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated
with al Qaeda…in cooperation with the international community…”45 Once counterterrorism
efforts no longer comprise “armed conflict” (which means that they do not fall under international
humanitarian law) international criminal law could be deployed to prosecute terrorism.
Specifically, the international community could draw upon jurisprudence from the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to prosecute terrorism. The STL, a tribunal formed by a 2007 treaty
between the United Nations and Lebanon to prosecute the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks that
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, offers several important contributions to
counterterrorism after the tipping point. First, the STL exercises jurisdiction solely over domestic
crimes, and is the first international tribunal to do so.46 This arrangement was created as a
compromise intended to safeguard the physical tribunal (by placing it in The Hague) due to
Lebanon’s instability, while also legitimizing Lebanese law. Thus, the STL set a precedent for
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international tribunals to prosecute terrorism in unstable countries. Second, the STL provides
jurisprudence to internationalize the Lebanese definition of terrorism which helped to “fill the gaps
in the evolving definition of terrorism as an international crime.”47 As a result, the international
community has a more stable body of law to prosecute terrorism under international criminal law.
Third, the STL established clearer jurisprudence for the international courts to deal with terrorism.
The International Criminal Court, or a new court developed exclusively to prosecute terrorism
cases, could provide a neutral forum that is distanced from nation-level conflict (as existed in
Lebanon). Further, such a court could provide a solution to terrorism cases where several states
have overlapping jurisdiction.48 But this scenario is contingent upon the end of terrorism as “armed
conflict,” and the consent of states to cede jurisdiction to international courts. Such concessions
are unlikely given growing hostility to international institutions like the International Criminal
Court.49 Moreover, the United States is unlikely to declare the end of “armed conflict” any time
soon because that assumption provides the needed legal cover of international humanitarian law.
It is unclear if the conflict against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces will ever end. Given the
conflict’s unconventional and inherently asymmetric nature, it is more likely that terrorist groups
will continue to adapt rather than formally stop fighting. For this reason, the United States can
reasonably claim that an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and affiliates will exist indefinitely.
Officials may never transition to international criminal law so that they can maintain the authority
to use military force. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently told the Senate
Armed Services Committee that al-Qa’ida affiliates “have proven resilient and are positioned to
make gains” despite counterterrorism efforts that have degraded the leadership in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.50 Thus, there is neither a consensus on how the war on terror could end, nor transition
strategy for when the tipping point arrives. As a result, the United States is likely to be engaged in
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a long-term conflict where strategy is built on the threat-inflating assumption of “armed conflict.”
Threat inflation can result in hawkish interventions against fragmented forces that are at best
tangentially associated with al-Qa’ida, creating a cycle that fuels violence and executive overreach.
Fragmentation and Associated Forces
Examining the fragmentation of al-Qa’ida first requires understanding the significance of
an “associated force,” and how the Obama administration deploys the term. In 2012, Jeh Johnson
defined an “associated force” by two characteristics: “(1) an organized, armed group that has
entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.”51 However, the Executive Branch initially presented
the reasoning of “associated force” in the 2009 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case Al-Bihani v.
Obama, a case concerning a Yemeni Guantanamo detainee who appealed the denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.52 Given that “associated forces” was not included in the original
AUMF, Al-Bihani v. Obama was the first time that the government considered the phrase in public.
The administration decided to present the phrase to legally account for the fragmentation of alQa’ida. The court did not contest the phrase, and chose to defer to the administration’s definition.
Since the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has the authority to review acts of the federal government
(even before Congress provided it with special jurisdiction in 1962), the panel’s decision set a
precedent.53 The decision effectively added “associated forces” to the AUMF’s original defensive
mandate to go after the “nations, organizations, or persons…[who] planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001.”54 The court’s deference
to the executive’s interpretation was a de-facto seal of approval that the administration would
summon for legitimacy, although the definition of “associated forces” was never debated in
Congress nor contested by the court.
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Yet at the same time the court supported the validity of “associated forces,” it contradicted
the administration’s justification for using the phrase. The theory behind “associated forces” is the
concept of “co-belligerency” from the international law of neutrality.55 Under the law of neutrality,
“states engaged in an international armed conflict are allowed to consider third-party states as cobelligerents of the enemy and thus subject to attack.”56 Before attacking suspected co-belligerents,
third-party states must be given a chance to declare their neutrality before they can be declared
enemies.57 Al-Bihani argued that because he was not given a chance to declare his neutrality, he
was unlawfully detained under the laws of war.58 The court rejected Al-Bihani’s arguments with
two rebuttals. First, the court argued that the doctrine of co-belligerency, which was derived from
outdated notions of state-centric international relations, could not be applied to a world defined by
non-state actors. Deploying the concept today would require false equivalencies because states no
longer occupy the same space in the world. Second, the court argued that Congress never intended
the international laws of war bind the AUMF:
There is no indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005…or the MCA of 2006 or 2009, that
Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s
war powers under the AUMF. The international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented
domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts.59

If the court found “no indication” in the relevant laws “that Congress intended the international
laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the
AUMF,” the president cannot legitimately use international law to justify his actions. Ironically,
in the process of attempting to grant the executive more authority, the court’s ruling did the
opposite by dashing the legitimacy of the Executive Branch’s deployment of international law.
The court’s arguments stand at odds with Jeh Johnson and Eric Holder’s arguments that utilize
international law as key premises for U.S. military force.60 It also contradicts the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Hamdi, which used international laws of war to justify the detention of enemy
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combatants. Further, when the court denied en banc review, they stated “the panel’s discussion of
[the relevance of international-law-of-war principles to the AUMF] is not necessary to the
disposition of the merits,”61 which reaffirmed the idea that international law was not a source of
authority for U.S. courts.62 The court’s ruling on the significance of international law for the
AUMF explains why the Supreme Court denied the case certiorari; the justices thought that the
lower court settled the laws in question.63 In other words, the courts agreed that the source of the
president’s authority vis-à-vis the AUMF was not from international law, even if international laws
of war apply to conduct elsewhere. And since “associated forces” had not been debated by
Congress, the administration’s actions existed in an extra-legal zone unregulated by both
international and domestic law.
Let us assume that international law in this case is authoritative so that we can examine
how the Obama administration deploys the concept of co-belligerency. Jens D. Ohlin at Cornell
explains two problems with applying co-belligerency and the international laws of neutrality to the
war on terror. First, it is unclear how the required provision for third-party states to publicly declare
their neutrality applies to individual terrorists such as Al-Bihani. Ohlin notes that suspected
terrorists “are not given the formal opportunity to declare their neutrality, nor are they given a
conventional form of notice that they are being declared a co-belligerent of Al Qaeda”64 before
being attacked. Second, applying co-belligerency to non-state terrorist networks assumes
homogeneity in goals and methods. While two groups may both be fighting against the United
States, they could also be fighting each other. This exact dilemma occurred when al-Qa’ida’s
Syrian affiliate, Nusra Front, started to compete with ISIL.65 While both ISIL and al-Qa’ida want
an Islamic state, they are fighting against each other for territory in Syria. Charles Lister, a Senior
Fellow at the Middle East Institute, explained that
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the Islamic State’s proclamation of a caliphate in June 2014 posed a substantial challenge to the jihadi
credibility of Nusra Front, which until that moment had controlled no territory unilaterally, frequently
cooperated with nationalist forces to govern areas, and was only imposing a bare minimum of sharia law.66

In other words, the groups have different goals and methods despite fighting the same enemy. The
nature of the conflict and actors involved renders the international law of neutrality obsolete,
thereby removing the legitimacy of the “co-belligerency” rationale for “associated forces”
However, Congress included “associated forces” within section 1034 of the Fiscal Year
2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).67 The bill states that Congress “supports the
Executive Branch’s interpretation” of “associated forces” provided in a 2009 filing before the D.C.
District Court in Al-Bihani v. Obama. Yet that interpretation provides little guidance as to what
“associated forces” means, or how government should apply it. In fact, the administration’s filing
dodged both questions:
It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and
degree of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or would be
sufficient to bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework.68

In other words, the Executive Branch kept the definition and application of both terms vague so
that they could apply them flexibly. Rep. Howard Berman, a Democrat from California, and Rep.
Chris Van Holen, a Democrat from Maryland, excoriated Congress for considering section 1034
without specifically defining “associated forces,” and not holding a single hearing on the matter.69
Robert M. Chesney at the University of Texas and Former Advisor to the Detainee Policy Task
Force, explained to the House Armed Services Committee why the inclusion of “associated forces”
is problematic. Since,
Section 1034 does not define “associated forces,” …this issue would remain as problematic under 1034 as it
does under the current AUMF… [because] we would still lack a clear metric as to when an affiliated or
related entity becomes an ‘associated force’ of al Qaeda.70

Chesney extended this argument in 2013 (unsatisfied by the administration’s clarifications in
speeches) by stating that the administration’s approach is ambiguous because it does not outline
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the initial question of how to determine whether a particular group is part of al Qaeda to begin with, bearing
in mind the fragmentation trend. And it also will be of little use if and when we reach the point that al Qaeda
itself is effectively destroyed, thus removing the predicate for a co [-] belligerency type of analysis.71

This ambiguity may cause administration officials to make decisions about which groups fall under
the AUMF without the consent of Congress. Acting on such decisions would exploit the AUMF’s
authority at the expense of the separation of powers in the name of national security.
Stephen Preston, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, demonstrated the
concrete implications of this deference to the executive when he testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 2014. Preston explained;
the determination that a particular group is an ‘associated force’ is made at the most senior levels of the U.S.
Government, following reviews by senior government lawyers and informed by departments and agencies
with relevant expertise and institutional roles, including all-source intelligence from the U.S. intelligence
community.72

It is undoubtable that one’s analysis of this issue would be different if he/she were privy to
classified information. Within this context, it becomes clear that the way the executive decides to
strike “associated forces” is unilateral. The decision making process that Preston described
exemplifies William B. Quandt’s analysis of how “bureaucratic politics” can impact a president’s
foreign policy: competing organizations and the sometimes-unreliable flow of information make
policy outcomes unpredictable.73 As a result, the process by which a group is determined to be an
“associated force” is opaque and likely to generate unpredictable results, especially in the era of
drone warfare.74 Therefore, the status quo incentivizes an exploitation of the AUMF because the
administration’s control of the law is unchecked by Congress.
This episode demonstrates that the definition of and justification for “associated forces”
exerts the “force of law without law.”75 If international laws are not applicable, but the executive’s
reasoning is contingent on those laws, and the court and Congress still defer to the executive’s
definition, it is applying no law except that which was generated by the executive. The courts and
Congress effectively allowed the executive to declare war against an indefinite set of groups
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without the specific consent of Congress—the only federal government branch that the U.S.
Constitution endows with war making authority76—by deferring critical legal questions about the
nature of “associated forces”. The courts likely deferred because they viewed the definition as
something for the political branches to determine; Congress deferred due to gridlock produced by
differing views on war powers. But if Congress continues to defer to the executive in this manner,
the results could be an unchecked expansion of the war on terror. The fragmentation al-Qa’ida and
the emergence of ISIL as a result creates instances for U.S. presidents to exploit the ambiguity of
“associated forces” and fight without Congressional authorization for extended periods of time.
Is ISIL an Associated Force of Al-Qa’ida?
A September 2014 leaked document from the Obama administration provides background
on ISIL’s complex formation and emergence. In 2003, a group called Jama’at al-Tawhid w’alJihad, which was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, merged with al-Qa’ida.77 Although bin Laden
and al-Zarqawi met in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999,78 it was not until 2004 that al-Zarqawi
officially pledged his group’s allegiance to bin Laden and became al-Qa’ida’s leader in Iraq
(AQI).79 After a U.S. airstrike killed al-Zarqawi in 2006, his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri (who
worked in the same group as al-Zarqawi in the 1980s) rebranded AQI as the Islamic State of Iraq
(ISI), and focused on exporting terror globally. Not long thereafter, al-Masri reaffirmed his bayah,
or oath of loyalty, to bin Laden, and also pledged to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi—his partner in ISI.
Al-Masiri wanted to retain ties to AQI while exploring a secession so that he could lead an
independent group. As Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan analyzed, “In jihadist terms, this was
like taking a mistress and presenting her as your second wife to your first.”80 In retrospect, alMasiri’s decision to pledge his loyalty to two organizations foreshadowed the severance between
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ISIL and al-Qa’ida. After both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed in an April 2010 U.S.-Iraqi
operation, the severance process began.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the leadership of ISI following his predecessors’ death, and in
2011 he assigned ISI member Muhammad al-Jolani to begin an operation in Syria known as the
Nusra Front.81 In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the official merger between the two
organizations under one name, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL].82 This decision
catalyzed a major dispute between the newly formed group and al-Qa’ida. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the
current leader of al-Qa’ida, disavowed both groups in a statement via Al Jazeera. Al-Zawahiri
argued that Al-Baghdadi was, “wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
without asking permission or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us,” and alJolani was “wrong by announcing his rejection to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and by
showing his links to al-Qaeda without having our permission or advice, even without notifying
us.”83 Essentially, al-Zawahiri “‘dissolved’ ISIS and ordered both ISI and al-Nusra back to [their]
geographically delimited corners, one having control over Iraq, the other over Syria.”84 AlBaghdadi defied the order by critiquing al-Zawahiri’s deference to the West’s artificial state
borders from Sykes-Picot.85 Al-Baghdadi’s statement delegitimized al-Zawahiri’s claim as the
leader of global jihadism and signaled an important ideological shift. In response, al-Qa’ida
formally severed from ISIL in February 2014: “ISIS is not a branch of [al-Qa’ida], we have no
organizational relationship with it, and [we] are not responsible for its actions.”86 This statement
reflected the distance between the groups and catalyzed conflict.
Since their official split in 2014, ISIL and al-Qa’ida have been in conflict and competition
for territory, legitimacy, and the identity of global jihadism. But ISIL was already functionally
independent from al-Qa’ida before the official split.87 ISIL’s declaration of the Islamic caliphate
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simply, “proclaimed that all previous loyalties were voided” and demanded global jihadi groups
to swear loyalty to al-Baghdadi, thereby upending the al-Qa’ida’s affiliate structure.88 The Obama
administration argues that this split
does not remove ISIL from coverage under the 2001 AUMF because ISIL continues to wage the conflict
against the United States that it entered into when, in 2004, it joined with bin Laden and al-Qa’ida in their
conflict against the United States.89

But this reasoning assumes that ISIL was fully constituted as the same group, with the same
ideological goals, leadership and similarities to al-Qa’ida at the time and since 2004. But as I have
outlined, there are and were significant differences from the very beginning (e.g. functional
independence, different leadership, contrasting methods) that should require a different approach.
Not only did ISIL upend the previous affiliate structure, the three fundamental ways that
the group differs (both then and now) from its predecessor demonstrate why it is difficult to
consider them “associated forces.” First, they oppose each other’s approach to the creation of an
Islamic caliphate. ISIL believes that military liberation should precede an ideological
transformation; al-Qa’ida believe the opposite.90 Divergent ideological stances explain why alQa’ida split from ISIL immediately after ISIL declared a caliphate, and speaks to a deep religious
difference between the groups. While al-Qa’ida’s strategy, ideology, and messaging were
“predicated on the expectation that it would not take power,” ISIL rejected this as defeatism and
tried to implement their vision immediately.91 Not only do they have completely different
ideological approaches, they are now fighting each other in Syria. Second, the threat from ISIL is
completely different than that of al-Qa’ida. Audrey K. Cronin at George Mason University, in an
article titled “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group,” went as far as to say that ISIL “is not an outgrowth
or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the next phase in its
evolution.”92 Since ISIL behaves more like a “pseudo-state led by a conventional army,” the
strategies that have contained al-Qa’ida, which acts more like a guerilla force, will not stop ISIL.93
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It is possible that the international counterterrorism will degrade ISIL to a point at which the group
can be fought as a guerilla force and prosecuted under international criminal law. But for the time
being, the U.S. requires an entirely new strategic framework—military and legal—to combat the
new threat. The stark differences between ISIL and al-Qa’ida disqualify the two as “associated
forces” or “co-belligerents” (terms which the courts rejected the international legal basis for) and
demonstrate that Washington requires a new military and legal strategy to account for a change.
The Extra-Legal War
Despite immense changes in the terror network’s ideologies and capabilities, the AUMF is
still construed as the operative framework for the war on ISIL. The Obama administration does
not believe that the president loses authority to fight ISIL vis-à-vis the AUMF,
simply because of differences between the group and al-Qa’ida’s current leadership. A contrary interpretation
of the statute would allow al-Qa’ida and its co-belligerents—rather than the U.S. President and Congress—
to control the scope of the AUMF by splintering into rival factions while still continuing to prosecute their
same conflict against the United States.94

Rather than ceding the terms of conflict to terrorists because of cursory leadership squabbles, the
administration argues, the president and Congress should dictate the terms. But as detailed above,
it is clear that the two groups have differences that extend far further than the leadership. Moreover,
Congress does not currently control the scope of the AUMF. The administration’s notion that a
contrary interpretation would incentivize groups to split into rival factions to control the scope of
the AUMF is misguided; if anything, a contrary interpretation would allow congress to control the
scope of the law by requiring new legislation to account for changing terror networks. The
administration’s argument neglects the fact that groups only split when fundamental ideological
differences exist (e.g. how a caliphate is to be declared). It is not practical or in the best interests
of the groups to split into infinite factions. If they did so, the groups would lose fighting power
and the ability to draw on a larger network. The split of ISIL from al-Qa’ida is distinct from
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factions forming branches to carry out the mission of the group at large; the latter indicates true
association and ideological alignment, while former does not. Third, ISIL’s military might makes
it a completely different enemy from al-Qa’ida. These are reasons why al-Qa’ida affiliates and
ISIL should remain distinct in U.S. policy and indicate that the war on terror has evolved faster
than the legal basis on which it is fought.
President Obama tacitly distanced the fight against ISIL from the 2001 AUMF when he
presented a new AUMF to address ISIL in February 2015.95 Obama explained that although he
believes that existing statutes provide enough authority, a new authorization would provide
flexibility to utilize special operations to eliminate ISIL’s leaders. Obama was committed to
“refine, and ultimately repeal, the 2001 AUMF” and pointed out the need to more specifically
tailor the 2001 AUMF’s authority to fit the present conflict.96 In other words, Obama recognized
the ambiguity of applying the 2001 AUMF to the conflict against ISIL. Secretary of State John
Kerry echoed this sentiment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by framing his argument
for a new AUMF as “a clear and formal expression of this Congress's backing at this moment” to
“dispel doubts that might exist anywhere that Americans are united in this effort.”97 Congress’
constitutional duty demands a debate on the proposal.
Since Obama’s proposal has not yet left committee, there has been no such formal
expression of Congressional backing. As a direct result, U.S. Army Captain Nathan Smith, an
intelligence officer stationed in Kuwait, challenged the legality of the war against ISIL. Given that
the president did not receive specific authorization from Congress for his actions against ISIL
within 90 days, Smith argues that the fight against ISIL is illegal under the WPR. An amicus curiae
brief submitted for Smith by Michael J. Glennon, a Professor of International Law at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, succinctly rebuts the Obama administration’s

22

Collinger
case on the WPR’s clear statement and 90 day rules.98 And given the court’s reasoning in
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Glennon argued that Smith’s case could not be considered
a political question in the exclusive domain of the executive. In Zivotofsky, the court reasoned that
if it abdicated its responsibility to determine whether a statute was constitutional, it would transfer
that authority to the executive and upend the separation of powers. If the court defers to the
executive in this case, the court could consent to vast new executive war powers without
Congressional approval.
While Glennon presents a convincing case, he misses one key point. The Obama
administration can claim that Congress authorized war against ISIL when it passed the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2012 and included the phrase “al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces,” which it now construes to also include ISIL. Chesney’s analysis about the ambiguity of
applying this phrase, which I have detailed above, demonstrates a violation of the WPR’s clear
statement rule. First, the clear statement rule requires application from a specific resolution
(“associated forces” was not in the original 2001 AUMF) and that the statue authorize force with
respect to a particular conflict. Second, the clear statement rule also prohibits the executive from
inferring a clear statement from “any provision contained in any appropriation Act” when that
provision does not authorize the introduction of U.S. forces into conflict.99 Since the sole
legislation that affirmed “associated forces” (where ISIL fits) comes from an appropriations act
(the NDAA of 2012), the term cannot be construed as Congressional authorization against ISIL
under the WPR. Therefore, the Obama administration has violated the WPR, placing anti-ISIL
operations in an ambiguous extra-legal zone, neither inside nor outside the law, due to judicial and
legislative deference. The administration’s actions come under the force of law when the courts
and Congress say that they are illegal.100
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Conclusion
If Congress and the courts permit such ambiguity to continue, it will enable a more hawkish
administration to, as Rep. Lee said, continue an open-ended war “with neither an exit strategy nor
a focused target.” Given president-elect Trump’s bellicosity and propensity to appoint foreign
policy advisers that subscribe to an extreme version of the “clash of civilizations” theory,101 which
will enflame the war on terror on both sides, Congress must reclaim its power to check the
executive. Congress can do so by passing a specific authorization that provides flexibility to fight
terrorism without sacrificing constitutional principles and risking the lives of American
servicemen and women.102 In the same way that contrived legal interpretations enabled
unpredictable events, it is impossible to predict how future administrations may continue the
current state of exception. Since only access to classified materials could fully answer the original
question of this paper, it is difficult to completely assess exactly how law was or was not applied.
Yet, this is precisely my argument: the state of exception operates covertly, wherein,
The normative aspect of law can…be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence
that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally—
nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.103

Inaction on the AUMF will enable future administrations to justify overreach in the Middle East
or elsewhere at the expense of U.S. national security, international norms and Constitutional
imperatives while still claiming legality. Such action will set dangerous precedents that eviscerate
the separation of powers to create an infinite state of exception. Congress must make the case that
the executive is no longer applying the law and force a new debate to reclaim control of the war
on terror. Congress must prevent the United States from enflaming terrorism, neglecting strategic
objectives, and inflicting further damage upon our Democracy.
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